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SECURITY INFORMATION

## INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. 

CD NO.

COUNTRY Korea

DATE DISTR. 31 October 1952

SUBJECT Arsenals in North Korea

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PLACE  
ACQUIREDSUPPLEMENT TO  
REPORT NO.Wonsan Area

1. Prior to 13 June 1952, there was an arsenal operating in the 1-ku Chungch'on-ni (approximately 127-26, 39-06) (CT-643345) area of Wonsan, at CT-645325. Although this factory was called the Wonsan shipyard, it was actually an arsenal.
2. Ventilators had been installed in the factory so there would be adequate ventilation during air raids when the entrances were blocked. Although the factory had been bombed several times and hit by a 1-ton bomb, the damage was not severe and production was continuing.
3. Installations at the arsenal included lathes, motors ranging in horsepower from 2 to 50, and a 50-horsepower generator. All of these machines were of Japanese manufacture, with the exception of one machine of an unidentified type, which was made in the United States.
4. The arsenal was producing the following materials:

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<u>Item</u>	<u>Daily Rate of Production</u>
Hand grenades	300 shells
Mines (Unidentified type)	500 shells
Rifle-cleaning rods	100
Barbed-wire cutters	100
Shovels	100

5. In addition to the above materials, the factory was producing firing pins for anti-aircraft artillery, parts for automobiles, horse shoes, and sickles, on special order. Occasionally, when large special orders came in, regular production was stopped until the special order was filled.
6. Raw materials were brought to the factory from Hungnam (127-36, 39-50) (CV-8010) in two Japanese-made Nissan trucks. Prior to 13 June 1952, there had been no shortage of raw materials. The amount of completed goods kept on hand was small since they were removed by truck once a week.
7. There were 100 employees at the arsenal, including 88 laborers, 1 of whom was a woman, and 12 clerks. Approximately 60 of the workers were members of the North Korean Labor Party, and 8 of the 60 were members of the Democratic Youth Alliance. Ten of the remaining 40 were opportunists and the other 30 were anti-Communists. Work attendance stood at from 60 to 65 percent. There had been many attempts to raise this figure, with no marked results. The attendance percentage was low because the majority of the non-party workers took jobs at the arsenal merely to avoid the labor draft.
8. The average worker's wage was 800 North Korean won per month. There was a contract bonus system, however, which was established both on an individual and a group basis, which raised the average to approximately 1,000 won per month. All clerks received 1,000 won. Various deductions made the pay considerably lower than this amount. Deductions included 1 percent for basic income tax, 1 percent for a social affairs premium, 10 percent for the Workers Alliance, and 2 percent for the Democratic Youth Alliance. In addition, there was a deduction of an unidentified amount which went to the North Korean Labor Party.
9. Employees received 2 days of leave each month but obtained no recreational allowance or benefits of any kind from their social affairs premiums. Sometimes soap and socks were distributed among the employees, but there was no regular system for such distribution. A dormitory connected with the arsenal housed 60 of the male workers. The dormitory fee, which included meals consisting of 4 1/2 hops<sup>1</sup> of rice with soup daily, was 700 won per month.
10. The plant was run in two shifts. One shift was from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. with 1 hour out for lunch, and the other was from 5 p.m. to 1 a.m. The shifts alternated each week. Resignation or transfer from the plant was difficult. When a worker was ill and unable to work, he had to submit a report and a diagnosis from a national hospital. The arsenal maintained its own hospital nearby. This hospital supplied free service to the employees of the arsenal, but facilities were poor and medical supplies limited. There were no guards outside the factory but someone was in the factory at all times.
11. Some of the products of the arsenal, mainly hand grenades, were being stolen

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by the workers. Occasionally the employees were searched as they left their work, but this was not standard procedure.

Area East of P'yŏngyang

12. As a result of United Nations bombing, the Central Mechanical Workshops, which were called Factory Number 65 of the Ministry of Industry, were divided into two branches and moved<sup>2</sup> in August 1950. In late June 1952 one of these branches was near Kunja-ri (126-08, 39-14) (BU-5346) at BU 536460 on the site of a former zinc and gold mine. The other branch was near Changhang (approximately 126-17, 39-07) (BU-508355) at BU-514356.
13. Five-hundred male workers and 100 females were employed at these two workshops. Pay was from 900 to 1,700 won plus 1 1/2 pints of rice per month.<sup>3</sup> To remedy the shortage of skilled workers, 200 trainees aged 17 to 30, including both men and women, were enrolled at an engineering school in April 1952.
14. The factories were producing parts for PPSH sub-machine guns, hand grenades, 82-mm. mortar shells, and ammunition.
15. As a result of the 23 June 1952 bombing of the Sup'ung power plant, electricity was cut off from these factories. Idle employees were believed to have been sent to work on collective farms.

Yongil-li Area

16. On 8 July 1952 a branch factory of the P'yŏngyang Ordnance Factory Number 65<sup>4</sup> was in two pits of a former gold mine at YD-330502 in the Yongil-li (125-42, 39-16) (YD-3349) area. Each pit was 40 meters long, 7 meters wide, and 4 meters high. The factory employed 17 lathemen, 250 laborers, and 30 clerks, and was producing PPSH's, rifles, hand grenades, and ammunition. Thirty guards from the North Korean army were on duty at all times.

Yat'ae-ri Area

17. On 13 August 1952, the Munch'ŏn (127-17, 39-17) (CU-5249) gunpowder plant was in a cave at the base of the mountain at CU-590475 in the Yat'ae-ri (127-22, 39-16) (CU-5947) area. The factory was producing hand grenades and ammunition for rifles of Soviet manufacture. The plant employed 340 male and 200 female workers. Working conditions were bad and the morale of the workers was low.
18. Some of the executives of the Munch'ŏn plant were as follows:
  - HAN Tong-kil (7281/2639/0679), manager
  - YIM Sŏk (2651/6932), assistant manager
  - SONG Myŏng-ku (1345/2494/0046), production chief
  - YŎM Chin (1670/3791), labor chief
  - PAK Ch'ang-kyu (2613/2490/1145), administration section
  - CHIN Tu-hŏn (7115/2435/2009), supply
  - YU Ch'ang-chun (2692/2490/0193), research section chief.

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1. [ ] Comment. One hop equals three-tenths of a pint.

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2. [ ] Comment. Presumably the move was from P'yongyang.

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3. [ ] Comment. The source probably intended to report that the food ration was 1 1/2 pints daily.

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4. [ ] Comment. [ ] from another source, an arsenal named the Sunan Branch workshop of the Ministry of National Security Number 65 was 500 meters north of the Sunan railroad station (125-41, 39-12) (YD-3242) in early June 1952. From other information available to this office, it is clear that the Number 65 arsenal has been reported at various locations in this area by a number of sources, but none of the locations has been satisfactorily confirmed; it is probably that this is the designation used for many branches of the factory.

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